Auburn Philosophical Society
The Auburn Philosophical Society consists of a group of professors, students, guest speakers and other guests that meets approximately every other Friday. A typical meeting, a paper is presented and is followed by a period of questions and discussions. Anyone who is interested is invited to attend and participate. Contact: Eric Marcus, 844-3626; HC 6090.
Current Schedule of Speakers and Papers
January 19: Jennifer Lockhart (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00.
"Might there be an antinomy of practical reason?" - In which it is argued that, absent the postulate of God, Kantian morality amounts to a form of self-sabotage.
February 9: James Shelley (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00.
"Beauty, Subjectivity, Disinterest" - Some people claim that judgments of beauty are subjective, by which they mean that beauty depends on the feelings of the person judging it and is not a property residing in the object. Some people claim that judgments of beauty are disinterested, by which they mean that such judgments do not give us reasons for action. I argue against each claim on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the fact that we can acquire reasons to experience beautiful objects we have not already experienced.
February 16: Alisa Bokulich (Boston University) in Ross 136 at 3:00.
Auburn Aesthetics Forum micro-conference:
- March 1: C. Thi Nguyen (Utah Valley) and Matthew Strohl (Montana) in Mell 2250 at 4:00. "Cultural Appropriation and the Intimacy of Groups" - We chart a middle path between overly restrictive and overly permissive normative views concerning cultural appropriation. The most restrictive normative position holds that, except under special conditions, we ought to defer to appropriation claims. We argue that this position threatens to undermine the capacity of groups to self-determine the dissemination of their own practices. We suggest that the normative importance of appropriation claims is best understood as deriving from group intimacy. We offer an account of group intimacy that expands on Julie Inness’s work on interpersonal intimacy. We propose that certain cultural practices are intimate practices for a group, and cultural appropriation can breach group intimacy. However, the intimacy account militates against blanket presumptions for or against cultural appropriation and supports instead attending to the wishes of each particular group. We conclude by raising a difficulty: many intimate groups are sub-agential and do not have clear procedure expressing their wishes.
- March 2: Matthew Strohl (Montana) in Ross 136 at 3:00. "Games and the Art of Agency" - Some games constitute a distinctive art form, whose medium is agency. Those games offer us the opportunity to temporarily manipulate basic features of our practical agency, taking on temporary ends and temporary abilities. This allows for a distinctive aesthetic form, in which designers create agencies and environments for the sake of aesthetic experiences of the player’s practical reasoning and practical action. The fact that we can play such games illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily, for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. But though such temporary ends are adopted instrumentally, we cannot treat them as such during game-play. In order to sustain the absorbed and committed experiences characteristic of game-play, we must entertain these temporary in-game ends as final. Playing games requires that we adopt temporary sub-agencies. Thus, game-playing demonstrates a significant fluidity of human agency.
March 23: Jeremy Fix (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00.
"Two Sorts of Constitutivism" - I first distinguish between two sorts of constitutivism. On the nature first view, something is subject to a certain normative standard because it is a particular of a certain genus. On the norms first view, something is a particular of a certain genus because it is subject to a certain normative standard. I argue that only the nature first view is fit for the explanatory goals of constitutivism in practical philosophy. This view needs a distinctive conception of the nature of certain genera in order to explain why only their particulars are by nature subject to normative standards. I spend the rest of that essay spelling out that view of the nature of those genera and showing the work in practical philosophy that it can do.
April 20: Elay Shech (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00.
"Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory" Historical inductions, viz., the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as non-cogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic meta-induction, e.g., in the context of some medical studies.
Last Updated: April 26, 2018